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ARTICLE

REFINING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
James E. Hickey, Jr.*
Vern R. Walker**"
I.

INTRODucrION

States have long recognized as a matter of domestic and international law that it is generally preferable to prevent pollution than
to deal with pollution after it has occurred.1 In statutory, regulatory, judicial, and foreign affairs contexts, states have applied preventive measures to a wide range of environmental settings, all
without much consciouspurpose to articulate a specific principle of
law. In 1985 and in 1987, however, parties to the Vienna Conven-

tion and the Montreal Protocol formally stated their determination
to take "precautionary measures" to prevent emissions of ozone

layer depleting substances.2 Since 1987, other international environmental instruments have increasingly referred to the "precau-

* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, New York. Ph.D. in
International Law, Cambridge University (Jesus College) 1977; J.D., University of Georgia, 1970. The authors thank Ruth Winick and Laurence Levinson for their research
assistance.
** Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, New York. J.D.,
Yale University, 1980; Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 1975.
1 See infra notes 22- 31 and accompanying text.
2 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541,
1551 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]: "Determined to protect the ozone layer by taking
precautionary measures to control equitably total global emissions of substances that
deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their elimination'on the basis of developments in
scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic considerations." hia The
Protocol was negotiated as a protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer. Id. at 1541.
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tionary principle," '3 to the "precautionary approach,"'4 or to the
"principle of precautionary action"' 5 when dealing with regional
and global environmental and developmental problems such as
marine pollution,6 water pollution,7 climate change,8 ozone layer
depletion, 9 hazardous waste, 10 and energy deVelopment."1 References to precaution reveal a variable, vague, and often confusing
"principle" for states to follow in preventing pollution.' 2
The assertion and "codification" in international agreements and
instruments of an ill-defined, ambiguous "principle" has created
uncertainty in international environmental law. 13 Uncertainty
3 E.g., Convention on the'Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312, 1316 [hereinafter U.N. Transboundary
Watercourses Convention]:
[Tjhe Parties shall be guided by the following principles:
(a) The precautionary principle, by virtue of which action to avoid the potential transboundary impact of the release of hazardous substances shall not be
postponed on the ground that scientific research has not fully proved a causal
link between those substances, on the one hand, and the potential. transboundary impact, on the other hand.
Id.
4 E.g., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874,
879 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities.. Where there are
threats of serious'or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradationY
Id.
5 E.g., Report of the Governing Council on the Work of Its Fifteenth Session, United
Nations Environment Programme, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 25, 12th mtg. at 153,
U.N. Doc. A/44/25 (1989) [hereinafter UNEP Report].
6 E.g., Ministerial Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution, Nov. 25, 1987, 27
I.L.M. 835 [hereinafter Second North Sea Declaration].
7 See, e.g., U.N. Transboundary Watercourses Convention, supra note 3, at 1312.
8 E.g., Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter Climate Change Convention]. The United States ratified the Convention on October
15, 1992. See U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Item 4 of the provisional agenda, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.237/INF.10/Rev.1 (1993).
9 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at 1541.
10 E.g., Bamako Convention on Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 30, 1991, art. 4, 30
I.L.M. 773 [hereinafter Bamako Convention].
11The Draft European Energy Charter Treaty Annex I, Sept. 14, 1994, 27/94 CONF. 104
[hereinafter Energy Charter].
12 See infra part Il1.
13 Dr. Lothar GtIndling, The Status in International Law of the Principle of Precaution-.
ary Action, 5 Int'l J. Estuarine & Coastal L. 23, 30 (1990). See generally James Cameron &
Juli Abouchar, The PrecautionaryPrinciple: A-Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy
for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 20-23 (1991)
(surveying the precautionary principle as an emerging principle of environmental law in
state practice, international declarations, and as a rule of customary international law; proposing a definition with key elements that include an evidentiary threshold, burden of
proof, a duty owed to the international society as a whole, and a policy for action in the
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exists on several interrelated topics: the legal and practical significance of the principle; the obligations assumed by states; the application of the principle to affected businesses; the relation of the
obligation to scientific data; and the future shape and content of
such a principle. For the business community, an unpredictable
precautionary principle inhibits efficiency and realistic corporate
planning, and increases the costs and risks of doing business. For
the larger international, community, ,the- present precautionary
principle impedes the- development of rational, coordinated, and
predictable environmental law and policy.
States and international organizations have invoked the precautionary principle in an attempt to resolve certain technical
problems and political tensions when dealing with international
environmental problems. Technically, the precautionary principle
responds to the varying degrees of scientific uncertainty and environmental risk by imposing a duty on states' to prevent pollution
despite a lack of scientific information.' 4 Politically, the precautionary principle attempts to address the inherent tension between
territorial state sovereignty and the international community's
growing need to address certain transnational, regional, and global
environmental and developmental problems. States have traditionally accommodated technical problems and political tensions,
at least in part, through international instruments such as bilateral
and multilateral treaties or international conventions. In general,
the greater the certaintyof pollution and the greater the potential
harm from pollution, the less states'tend to resist a requirement to
prevent pollution.
In balancing such problems and tensions since 1987, states have
begun to refer explicitly to a precautionary principle of international law. If the present precautionary, principle is to provide
more than platitudinal support for pollution prevention, it must
evolve into a refined rule that would adjust to new and evolving
Environmental Policy and
face of uncertainty); Ellen Hey, The PrecautionaryConcept in.
Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 303, 303 (1992) (recognizing
that the meaning of the precautionary principle is unclear and, therefore, limiting the article's scope to an analysis of the principle); Bernard A. Weintraub, Science, International
EnvironmentalRegulation and the PrecautionaryPrinciple: Setting Standardsand Defining
Terms, 1 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 173, 182-91, 198-200 (1992) (examining the development and
criticism of the precautionary principle, as it has been applied under -various standards;
noting the inherent difficulty of formulating environmentally protective standards while
also promoting growth).
.14
See Hey, supra note 13, at 305; see also Weintraub, supra note 13, at 178 (noting the
principle's controversial requirement of environmentally protective decisions before harmful effects have been scientifically proven).
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factual situations, to more sophisticated norms of international law,
and to advances in scientific knowledge. The global community
needs a more specific rule of restraint adaptable to a wide range of
new environmental circumstances, rather than isolated agreements
that share only a general preference for pollution prevention.
The evolution of a set of refined precautionary obligations at
regional and global levels will be difficult to achieve. Both states
and private actors will resist. a precautionary principle that is
informative and enforceable by the international community.
States naturally want to protect their 'territorial sovereignty, and
private actors understandably seek freedom from regulation. The
international community needs to agree to some means to overcome that resistance and to refine the precautionary principle.
This Article suggests criteria to refine the precautionary principle, to remove the present uncertainty, and to provide a measure of
needed predictability that presently does not exist. The Article
presents a process framework through which states may refine the
content of the precautionary principle in a consistent and predictable way. Part II sets out a brief contextual background for the
precautionary principle as an emerging term of art in international
environmental law. Part III analyzes the present uncertainty in a
representative cross section of existing statements of the precautionary principle. Part IV proposes that states adopt an agreed set
of criteria for drafting statements of the precautionary principle in
future international agreements. If the criteria proposed here are
uniformly applied, every articulation of the precautionary principle
would contain: (1) a reasonably precise statement of the desired
environmental goal and the environmental condition that justifies
invoking the 'precautionary principle;, (2) an identification of the
jurisdictional scope of the agreed precautionary obligations under
the principle; (3) a specification of those human activities for which
precautionary measures are required; and (4) a clear statement of
the precautionary measures that must be undertaken before engaging in a covered activity.
II.

BACKGROUND

The rapidly developing body of international environmental law
has evolved partly out of domestic tort law principles that require
compensation when legally protected interests are injured. The
Roman law concept of immissio imposed responsibility on a person
for water, smoke, fragments of stone, and the like, introduced to a
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neighbor's property. 15 Similarly, the British common law imposed
an obligation on a person to compensate for resulting damage
when he used his property in a way that injured another person's

property. 16 Early domestic law imposed no duty, and therefore no
compensation was due, until an injury occurred.

In international law states are held responsible for polluting
activities inside their territory that cause harm in neighboring
states according to the foundational premise upon which all state
responsibility rests: "one must so use his own as not to do injury to
another" (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas).17 By the middle of

the twentieth century, the concept had been applied in a variety
of forms and circumstances,' 8 including pollution of international

15 See Max Kaser, Roman Private Law 122 (Rolf Dannenbring trans., 3d ed. 1980); see
also James E. Hickey, Jr., Custom and Land-Based Pollution of the High Seas, 15 San
Diego L. Rev. 409, 422 n.32 (1978).
16 The most famous common law adoption of this principle is found in Rylands v.
Fletcher, 1868 L.R.-Z. & I. App. 330,339-40 (1868). Lord Cairns, L.C., concurring with and
quoting Blackburn, J., stated:
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there inything likely to do
mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is
prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of
its escape.
,
17Hickey, supra note 15, at 422; see also Corfu Channel (Gr. Brit. v. Aib.), 1949 I.C.J. 57
(Apr. 9). International law obliges every state "not to allow knowingly its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights of other states." Id. at61. It should be noted that in the
Corfu Channel case, the injury to British warships for which Albania was held responsible
occurred inside Albanian territorial waters rather than beyond its borders. Id. at 58. For
an analysis of sic utere tuo in customary international law, see Hickey, supra note 15, at
422-75.
18 See United Nations Secretariat, Survey of International Law in Relation to the Working Codification of the International Law Commission, at 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/1/Rev. 1
(1949) ("There has been general recognition of the rule that a state must not permit the use
of its territory for purposes injurious to the interests of other States in a manner contrary
to international law.").
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rivers, 19 transboundary air pollution, 20 and pollution of outer
space. 2 '
For the most part, the responsibility of states for extraterritorial
pollution until recently has been approached in international law
on a case-by-case basis through assignments of compensation after
19 See Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Report of the
Conference, arts. X, XI, at 477, 496-505 (1967) ("[A] state... must prevent anynew form
of water pollution ... in an international drainage basin which would cause substantial
injury in the territory of a co-basin state .... [T]he state responsible [for causing substantial injury] shall be required to cease the wrongful conduct and compensate the injured cobasin state."); see also R. R. Baxter, The Law of International Waterways 2 n.3 (1964)
(describing reconciliation of competing river uses, including prohibition of uses restraining
preferred uses by other states); The Law of International Drainage Basins (A. Garretson et
al. eds., 1967); C.B. Bourne, InternationalLaw and Pollution of InternationalRivers and
Lakes, 6 U.B.C. L. Rev. 115, 120-35 (1971) (citing "equitable utilization" as a basis for
resolving conflicting interests in international drainage basins, a doctrine requiring consideration of the harm that might flow from one basin use to other co-basin states); Albert E.
*Utton, InternationalWater Quality Law, in International Environmental Law 154, 158-69
(Ludwik A. Teclaff & Albert E. Utton eds., 1974).
20 Decision, Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal,35 Am. J. Int'i L. 684 (1941) (holding that a
state is responsible for injury to the neighboring territory by noxious fumes emanating
from works within the state:
[U]nder the principles of international law, as well as the law of the United
States, no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Id.).
21 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. IX,
18 U.S.T. 2410, 2416-17, (in force Oct.. 10, 1967), 6 I.L.M. 386, 388 (1967) [hereinafter
Outer Space Teaty]. The Outer Space Treaty represents the best evidence of applicable
principles of international law for outer space and adopts the duty of states not to pollute
extraterritorial outer space. With regard to pollution of outer space, it employs somewhat
tentative precautionary language in obligating states to engage in international consultation if their planned activities are potentially harmful:
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to
avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter
and' where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a
State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment
planned by it or its nationals in outer space ... would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space ... it shall undertake appropriate international
consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.
Id. As of 1991 there were 98 parties to the Treaty. See Declarationof Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of State in the Explorationand Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962,
U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963) (adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly).
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environmental harm has occurred. 22 This post-delictual approach
has reflected a strong state sovereignty presumption that states are
free to behave as they please and are answerable, if at all, only
after their behavior either has infringed on the sovereign rights of
other states or has violated international law.23 The ,compensatory
approach has also reflected the traditional view that pollution is
largely a local concern that poses isolated risks to a local
environment.

The 1972 United Natiofis Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden (Stockholm Conference)
reflected an effort by the international community to address pollutiori.24 That movement, however, did little to disturb traditional
notions of state sovereignty, which tended to preserve the postinjury approach to state responsibility for polluting acts. For example, the Stockholm Conference Report required that substances
introduced into the sea must "result" in "deleterious effects"
before they could be defined as marine "pollution." 25 That is,
unless it could be established that actual harm occurred no liability
could be imposed on states.26 The Stockholm Conference Report
also required that deleterious effects be established by a demonstrable scientific certainty.27 Potential deleterious effects or the

likelihood of deleterious effects were, not within the meaning of
pollution. Under the Stockholm definition of pollution, states
22 See supra notes 17-21. The post-delictual approach to state responsibility was not
without exception. For example, the parties to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty agreed to
consult in circumstances where their activities have the potential to harm outer space, and
the Helsinki rules contain river pollution prevention obligations that would be imposed on
drainage basin states.
23 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
24 See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 and Corrigenda 1 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Conference Report];
see also G.A. Res. 2994-3004, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 42-48, U.N. Doc. A/
8730 (1973). For example, the Stockholm Conference Report defined marine pollution in
terms of generic effects: "The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or
energy into the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting in such deleterious
effects as harm to living resources, hazard to human health, hindrance to marine activities
including fishing, impairment of quality for tse of sea water,.and reduction of amenities."
Stockholm Conference Report, supra, at 73.
25 Stockholm Conference Report, supra note 24, at 73. In part, this Report acknowledged that waste disposal was. a legitimate use of the oceans as much as fishing or navigation. It was only when waste disposal had "deleterious effects" that it became both
pollution and objectionable. See generally The North Sea: Challenge and Opportunity 78
(M.M. Sibthorp ed., 1975) ("[Ijt is generally acknowledged that disposal of wastes into the
sea is essential and, therefore, acceptable ....).
.26 -Stockholm Conference Report, supra note 24, at 74.
27

Id. at 22-24. In Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal,supra note 20, the Tribunal similarly

required "substantial injury" demonstrated by "clear and convincing evidence."
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could only be held responsible under international law after discharges into the environment had occurred, and then only if environmental harm was established. 8
In the 1980s, environmental concern began to encompass both
threats of regiorial and global injuries, such as marine pollution,
global warming, ozone layer depletion, sea level rise, deforestation,
acid rain, and desertification, 29 and collective human and corporate
activity that could cause cumulative injury to a weakened global
environment. 30 As a result of that concern the focus of interna-

tional environmental attention expanded from local, transboundary harms to regional and global. harms, from isolated
polluting activities to broad patterns of activity, and from case-bycase determinations to general proscriptions of behavior. With the

change in focus, the shield of state sovereignty began to yield, and
states began to acknowledge some responsibility for preventing
pollution. For example, the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST)
expanded the Stockholm Conference definition of marine pollution
to include substances that are "likely to result" in deleterious
effects. 3 1. By implication, this definitional expansion imposed an
element of precautionary obligation on parties to the LOST, possibly even in circumstances of scientific uncertainty about harm and
causation.
Any legal duty international law imposes on states to refrain
from polluting activities (such as a general duty to exercise precau-

tion) or to prevent others from polluting necessarily involves a
diminution or relinquishment of territorial state 'sovereignty
because states no longer are free to deal with pollution originating
28 This approach was consistent with then-existing international law. See Hickey, supra
note 15, at 458-59.
29 See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 2; United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874; Ministerial Declaration on Environmentally.Sound and Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific, U.N. Doc A/Conf.
151/pc 38 Annex 2 (1991) (discussing the necessity for global partnership in environmental
efforts).
30 See Alfred Aman, The Earth as an Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on Domestic
Regulation, 102 Yale L.J. 2107-08 (1993);,see also J.E. Lovelock, Gaii: A New Look at Life
on Earth (1979) ("The Earth's living matter, air, oceans, and land surface form a complex
system ... with a composite identity ... . [and not] the mere sum of its parts.").
31 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1271 (Dec.
10, 1982) ("'[Plollution of the marine environment' means, the introduction by man,
directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living
resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water
and reduction of amenities.") (emphasis added).
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inside their territory in any way they choose. 32 For that reason, an
imposition of state responsibility should not be inferred lightly.
For the most part, no obligation is imposed on a state under treaty
law unless the state expressly consents to the obligation.33 The
state expression of consent to be bound to exercise precaution with
respect to polluting activities has begun to appear in a variety of
international environmental instruments. 4 The articulations to

date offer little specific predictive certainty for either the form or
the content of the precaution obligation in the years ahead. The
transition from an inchoate general obligation, of pollution prevention to be
a well-defined
principle or rule of precautionary obligation
would
facilitated

by the consistent application of agreed-upon
criteria. These criteria could be used to articulate precautionary
obligations in future agreements and to facilitate subsequent adop-

tion of consistent implementation procedures and enforcement
schemes.
III.

CURRENT UNCERTAINTY IN THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE

The articulations of the precautionary principle since 1987 reveal
a variable, vague, and confusing "principle" under which states are
32 See International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 2406 [hereinafter Dumping Convention]. The Convention asserted
that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
Id.; see also Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 822 ("Reaffirming that States have sovereign rights over their own biological resources; [r]eaffirming
also that States are responsible for conserving their biological diversity and for'using their
biological resources in a sustainable manner.").
33 The understandable concern about sovereignty diminution has led states
to rely on
the treaty form rather than on customary international law to address pollution prevention
obligations. See James E. Hickey, Jr., Land-Based Pollution of the High Seas and International Law, 1980 Marine Tech. 216, 218-19. States prefer the clarity of written treaties that
are the product of direct state negotiations and result in an overt, contractual state acceptance. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 11, 8 I.L.M. 679, 684 (1969)
("The consent of a state to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange
of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by
any other means if so agreed."); see also Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties 39-42 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing ways a state may express intent to be bound by a
treaty).
34 See infra part III.A.
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to carry out various duties to prevent pollution. The articulations
below are contained in a series of international instruments that
range from a non-binding report issued by the United Nations
Environment Programme3 5 to the binding European Union
Treaty.3 6 The articulations also vary from non-binding, but fairly
specific articulations like that contained in the North Sea Protection Declaration,37 to articulations that are binding in form, but
very vague in. content, like that in the Climate Change Convention. 38 The great variety in form, the different binding effects of
the instruments, the wide scope of subjects addressed, and the differing identity of participants from instrument to instrument do not
permit a more useful grouping of the articulations of the precautionary principle than the chronological order presented below.
The emphasis here is on the articulations themselves rather than on
the instruments in which they appear, or on the positions (preambles, articles, summaries, etc.) they occupy in any particular
document.
A. Articulations of the PrecautionaryPrinciple
This subpart reproduces, in chronological order, articulations
of the precautionary principle in the major environmental
instruments.
1. Ozone Layer Protocol:
Parties to this protocol ... Determined to protect the ozone

layer by taking precautionary measures to control equitably
total global emissions of substances that deplete it, with the
ultimate objective of their elimination on the basis of developments in scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic considerations.3 9
2. Second North Sea Declaration:
[I]n order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging
effects of the most dangerous substances, . . . a precautionary approach is addressed which may require action to conUNEP Report, supra note 5, at 152-53.
Treaty on European Union, Sept. 21, 1994, 31 I.L.M.'247, 285-86.
37 Final Declaration of the Third International 'Conference on the Protection of the
North Sea, Mar. 7-8, 1990, 1 Y.B. Int'l Envtl. L. 658,662-73 (1990) [hereinafter Final North
Sea Declaration].
38 Climate Change Convention, supra note 8, at 854-55.,
39 Montreal Protocol supra note 2, at 1551. This agreement was negotiated as a protocol
to the Vienna Convention for The Protection of the Ozone Layer. Id at 1541; see also
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.LM. 1516.
35
36
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trol inputs of such substances even before a causal link has
been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence
40

3. United Nations Environment Programme:
Recommends that all Governments adopt the "principle of
precautionary action" as the basis of their policy with regard
to the prevention and' elimination of marine pollution.4 '
4. Nordic Council's Conference:
[A]nd taking into account... the need for an effective precautionary approach, with that important principle intended
to safeguard the marine ecosystem by, among other things,
eliminating and preventing pollution emissions where there
is reason to believe that damage or harmful effects are likely
to be caused, even where there is inadequate or inconclusive
scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions
and effects.4 2
5. Final North Sea Declaration:
The participants... will continue to apply the precautionary
principle, that is to take action to avoid potentially damaging impacts of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable
to bioaccumulate even where there is no scientific evidence

to prove a causal link between emissions and effects

....

-

43

6. Bergen Declarationon Sustainable Development:
In order' to achieve sustainable development, policies .must
be based on the precautionary principle. Environmental
measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of
environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to
prevent environmental degradation."
Second North Sea Declaration, supra note 6, at 838.
UNEP Report, supra note 5.
42 The Nordic Council's International Conference on the Pollution of theSeas: Final
40
41

Document, agreed to Oct. 18, 1989, in Nordic Action Plan on Pollution of the Seas, 99 app.
V (1990) [hereinafter Nordic Council Conference].
43

Final North Sea Declaration, supra note 37, at 661.

44- Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, UN

Doc. A/CONF. 151/PC/10 (1990), reprintedin 1 Y.B. Int'l Envtl. L. 429,431 (1990) [hereinafter Bergen Declaration].
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7. Second World Climate Conference:
In order to achieve sustainable development in all countries
and to meet the needs of present and future generations,
precautionary measures to meet the climate challenge must
anticipate, prevent, attack, or minimize the causes of, and
mitigate the adverse consequences of, environmental degradation that might result from climate change. Where there
.are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent such environmental
degradation. The measures adopted should take into
account different socio-economic contexts.45
8.

Bamako Convention on Transboundary Hazardous
Waste:

Each Party shall strive to adopt and implement the preventive, precautionary approach to pollution problems which
entails, inter-alia, preventing the release into the environment of substances which may cause harm to humans or the
environment without waiting for scientific proof regarding
such harm. The Parties shall cooperate with each other in
taking the appropriate measures to implement the precautionary principle to pollution prevention through the application of clean production methods, rather than the pursuit
of a permissible emissions approach based on assimilative
capacity assumptions ... 46
9. European Union Treaty:
Community policy on the environment.., shall be based on
the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive actions should be taken, that environmental damage
should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.47
10. Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and InternationalLakes:
The precautionary principle, by virtue of which action to
avoid the potential transboundary impact of the release of
hazardous substances shall not be postponed on the ground,
that scientific research has not fully proved a causal link
45 Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference (1990), reprinted in
1 Y.B. Int'l Envtl. L. 473, 475 (1990) [hereinafter Second World Climate Conference].
46 Bamako Convention, supra note 10, at 781.
47

Treaty on European Union, supra note 36, at 285.
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between those substances, on the one hand, and the potential transboundary impact, on the other hand ...
11. The Rio Declarationon Environment and Development:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.4 9
12. Climate Change Convention:
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and
mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
should not-be used as a reason for. postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal
with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure
global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To. achieve this,
such policies and measures should take into account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all
relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases
and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts
may be carried out cooperatively
to address climate change
0
by interested Parties.
13. UNCED Text on Ocean Protection:
A precautionary and anticipatory rather than a reactive
approach is necessary to prevent the degradation of the
marine environment. This requires, inter alia, the adoption
of precautionary measures, environmental impact assessments, clean production techniques, recycling, waste audits
and minimization, construction and/or improvement of sewage treatment facilities, quality management criteria for the
proper handling of hazardous substances, and a comprehensive approach to damaging impacts from air, land and water.
Any management framework must include the improvement

48

U.N. Transboundary Watercourses Convention, supra note 3, at 1316.

49 Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at 879.
so Climate Change Convention, supra note 8, at 854.
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of coastal human settlements and the integrated management and development of coastal areas."'
14. Energy Charter Treaty:
In pursuit of sustainable development and taking into
account its obligations under those international agreements
concerning the environment to which it is party, each Contracting Party shall strive to minimize in an economically
efficient manner harmful Environmental Impact occurring
either within or outside its Area from all operations within
the Energy Cycle in its Area, taking proper account of
safety. In doing so each Contracting Party shall act in a
Cost-Effective manner. In its policies and actions each Contracting Party shall strive to take precautionary measures to
prevent or minimize Environmental Degradation. The Contracting Parties agree that the polluter in the Areas of Contracting Parties, should, in principle, bear the cost of
pollution, including transboundary pollution, with due
regard to the public interest and without distorting investment in the Energy Cycle or International Trade. 52
B. Analysis
The above articulations of the precautionary principle permit
several positive observations. First, each articulation consistently
affirms the premise that pollution prevention is preferable to postdelictual assignments of responsibility after damage has occurred.53
Second, these articulations link scientific evidence, and potentially
risk analysis, to any determination of pollution prevention obligations, by asserting that the necessary degree of precaution is primarily a function of the available scientific data which establishes
that necessity. Third, the current articulations of the precautionary
principle generally require a greater obligation to exercise precaution in proportion to the risk of irreversible permanent damage to
human life or health. Fourth, the growing frequency with which
the precautionary principle is invoked strongly suggests that future
S UNCED Text on. Protection of Oceans, Preparatory Committee for the United
Nation's Conference on Environmental Development, Protection of Oceans, All Kinds of
Seas Including Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, Coastal Areas and the Protection,
Rational Use and Development of Their Living Resources, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess.,*UN
Doc. A/CONF. 151/PC/100/Add. 21 (1991) [hereinafter UNCED Text].
52

Energy Charter, supra note 11, at 30.

53 See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
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international treaties and legal instruments will continue to invoke
precaution and link that precaution to scientific analysis.
Beyond those general propositions, however, the articulations
since 1987 have not refined the pollution prevention obligation into
a predictable substantive rule of precautionary obligation. Fundamental uncertainties still must be addressed. First, it is unclear
whether precaution is a recommendation, an obligation, or some
intermediate duty. In some articulations "a precautionary
approach... may require action, 54 a report only "recommends"
adoption of a "'principle of precautionary action,"' 5 or an agreement only urges the parties to "strive to adopt and implement the
preventive, precautionary approach. '56 Other articulations
encourage precaution by asserting that the participants "will continue to apply the precautionary principle, 57 or by declaring that
environmental measures taken by states "must anticipate,
prevent
5' 8
degradation.
environmental
of
causes
the
attack
and
Second, the level of environmental risk that triggers precautionary measures remains unsettled. While scientific certainty is not a
precondition to a recommendation or obligation to exercise precaution, the degree of scientific uncertainty that must be overcome
before precaution is required is unclear. The precautionary principle might be invoked in some articulations "even before a causal
link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence,. 59
"even where there is inadequate or inconclusive scientific evidence
to prove a causal link," 6 or "even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link."'61 Other articulations emphasize that
"lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing [precautionary steps].', 62 Finally, some articulations are
silent on the amount of scientific proof or knowledge necessary to
link the activity to its detrimental effects.63
Third, uncertainties exist regarding not only which sciences, factors, or scientific determinations are relevant, but also the factual
54

Second North Sea Declaration, supra note 6, at 835, 838.

5 UNEP Report, supra note 5.

Bamako Convention, supra note 10, at 781.
57 Final North Sea Declaration, supra note 37, at 661.
58 Bergen Declaration, supra note 44, at 431.
59 Second North Sea Declaration, supra note 6, art. VII, at 838.
60 Nordic Council Conference, supra note 42, at 99.
61 Final North Sea Declaration, supra note 37, at. 661.
62 Second World Climate Conference, supra note 45, art. 11(7), at 475.
63 E.g., Tieaty on European Union, supra note 36, at 285; Energy Charter, supra note 11;
UNCED Text, supra note 51.
56
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settings in which different levels of scientific knowledge would
apply. The obligation to exercise precaution is sometimes ren64
dered'imprecise by references to "economic considerations,

"different socio-economic contexts,

'65

and application by states

"according to their capabilities." 66 The Rio Declaration, in providing that "the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by
States according to their capabilities," contains all of the above
uncertainties, falling ambiguously between recommendation and
obligation.67

The uncertainties and ambiguities in the articulations of the precautionary principle have allowed sovereign 'nations to sign agreements they otherwise might -not sign because the precautionary
obligations are likely to be unenforceably vague. Now that the
precautionary principle has become a widely accepted international political practice, the next phase should be to strengthen the
content of future articulations and to refine and develop the substanfive obligation to exercise precaution.
IV.

CRITERIA OF ADEQUACY FOR FUTURE ARTICULATIONS OF
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

A.

Introduction

Several preliminary comments are appropriate. The first concerns a developmental process through which substantive principles of international law might evolve. In the early stages of
invoking a novel "principle" of international law, the substantive
implications of the new principle might not be fully appreciated,
and precise obligations might not be politically acceptable. In
addition, there does not then exist the history of state practice that
eventually provides substantive content and specific contours to
the principle over time. It is understandable, therefore, that initial
articulations would be somewhat unformed and general. It is in
this manner that articulations of the precautionary principle to date
have often left unresolved the basic types of uncertainties discussed
in the previous Part.
64 Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at 1550.

65 Second World Climate Conference, supra note 45, art. 11(7), at 475.
66 Rio Declaration, supra note 4, princ. 15, at 879.
67 Id Interestingly, the Climate Change Convention produced at the Rio Conference
reverts to recommendation rather than obligation with language that states "should" exercise precaution to prevent climate change. Climate Change Convention, supra note 8, art.
III, at 854.
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The evolution of an effective precautionary principle, however,
requires the gradual removal of such core uncertainties. This process of eliminating uncertainty can be made more efficient by
agreeing upon the nature of future treaty articulations of the precautionary principle. If a consensus can be reached about criteria
of adequacy for future articulations, then such criteria would provide a useful list of elements that precautionary provisions should
incorporate. Increased clarity in future articulations would in turn
better enable states, businesses, and citizens to predict which of
their future activities are likely to conform to their duties under the
evolving precautionary principle.. .
Second, the evolution of the precautionary principle has reached
a stage at which it seems possible to forge such a consensus on
criteria of adequacy. Virtually all states have by now repeatedly
affirmed the general axiomatic notion that preventing environmental harm is preferable to trying to remedy the harm once it has
occurred.68 States therefore seem ready to become more specific
about what a precautionary principle of international law entails.
The international community needs to agree to reject the level of
vagueness that has prevailed in many of the past precautionary
treaty provisions.
Third, any fruitful set of criteria should take into account the
best of the treaty articulations agreed upon to date. Such evolutionary continuity supports the claim that the proposed criteria are
intended to promote a refinement ofa principle that the international community has already accepted. Articulations of the principle in a few regional treaties, such as the North Sea treaties,69
come close to being "adequate" under the proposed criteria, and
this helps to legitimate the proposal that parties should achieve the
specified level of detail in every future treaty. States should now
agree to achieve a minimal amount of precision in all future articulations of that principle of precaution on which they have already
agreed in general in the past.
Fourth, at this stage of development, agreement on criteria of
adequacy is more likely to occur than agreement on a list of substantive obligations and rights. This tendency is due to the complicated nature of environmental protection and to the apparent
political unacceptability of more substantive requirements. Governments and private parties do not always agree on what specific
See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
69 .Second North Sea Declaration, supra note 6; Final North Sea lbeclaration, supra note
37; see also discussion infra part !V.B.5.
68
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precautionary measures are necessary, technologically possible,
economically feasible, or likely to succeed. 70 Moreover, different
environmental problems involve balancing different combinations
of such relevant factors as type of injury, economic impacts, and
private rights. Presumably, this complexity is one reason why so
many treaties to date have settled for Vague articulations of the
precautionary principle. Given these problems, it is unlikely that
any present formulation of the principle would be substantively
informative and politically acceptable, and yet strike the "right"
balance for all environmental problems.
In addition, not many states would adopt 'or implement a sweeping surrender of national sovereignty. Any criteria designed to
promote further elucidation of a precautionary principle must recognize that reality. Therefore, national interests and activities
should continue to enjoy presumptive legitimacy unless some international environmental concern warrants precautionary intervention. A theory of adequacy for articulations of the precautionary
principle should respect the national sovereignty of states, allow as
much freedom of action as possible to private and governmental
actors, yet balance that respect and freedom against the legitimate
interest of the international community in protecting global and
regional environments.
What states can usefully agree upon at the present time are process-oriented criteria that (a) set minimal standards of content for
articulations in future agreements, (b) allow states to continue to
balance in particular .cases their concerns for state sovereignty and
economic well-being with concerns for environmental protection,
yet (c) promote the gradual evolution of the precautionary principle through more informative articulations than in the past. Adequate articulations would put the international community on
notice as to precise terms of the parties' agreement, and thus would
contribute to the evolution of a useful and accepted content for the
precautionary principle itself. Finally, states should agree that all,
future articulations will satisfy these criteria.

70 See, e.g., William H. Rogers, Jr., Environmental Law 24-39 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasizing
the interdisciplinary aspects of environmental law, and describing the field as "an ongoing
kaleidoscope of tussling organizations, interests, jurisdictions, and states whose strategies,
goals, and outcomes are subject to constant redefinition").
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B. Proposed Criteriaof Adequacy
This Article proposes the following four criteria for testing the
adequacy of articulations of the precautionary principle in future
agreements.
1. Any future articulation should contain a reasonably precise statement of the environmental goals to be achieved,
and should cite those goals in justifying the invocation of the
precautionary principle.
2. Any future articulation should specify the jurisdictional
scope of the invocation, either geographically or by reference to some portion of the ecosystem ,to be protected. It
may; but need not, further restrict the scope of the invocation by specifying the type of harm or hazard subject to the
treaty.
3. Any future articulation should clearly identify the "covered" human activities for which the, principle requires precautionary measures. These covered activities may be
identified by enumeration or by a generic formula referring
to the type of harmful effect targeted, to the environmental
condition capable of causing those harmful effects, and to
the required degree of scientific confidence about effects
and causation.
4. Any future articulation should clearly state the procedural, investigative, and substantive measures that are
required in connection with any covered activity.
This Article will now discuss each of these criteria in turn.
1.

The Statement of Environmental Goals

A statement of the environmental goals, in the context of justifying the invocation of the precautionary principle, serves several
functions. First, such a statement specifies for the parties to the
treaty and for the larger world community the desirable environmental condition on which the parties have agreed. Examples of
goal statements that are reasonably specific and informative
include the elimination or reduction of anthropogenic climate
changes, 71 or of anthropogenic effects on the ozone layer, 72 or of
anthropogenic harmful effects on the marine environment.73 Such
71

72
73

See Second World Climate Conference, supra note 45, art. HI(10), at 476.
See Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at 1551.
See Final North Sea Declaration, supra.note 37, at 661.
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specific goal statements may help the parties to interpret treaty
provisions or to resolve later disputes over enforcement.74 Such
affirmative agreements on specific environmental goals within specific ecosystems may also be informative to other states that are
not parties to the agreement, in ways to be discussed below.
Second, articulating the need for precaution helps legitimate the
intervention of international interests and notifies all parties of that
intervention. The treaty registers with the international community yet another agreement between states in which there is a consensus as to the importance of a specific environmental goal, and
the desire to avoid the costs of an environmental injury.
It is important that the statement of environmental goals should
take into account only environmental considerations. The statement should identify a desirable environmental end-state that
reflects only the concerns of environmental science. Political and
economic factors should be balanced in a different element of the
provision invoking the precautionary principle. If such a statement
is confined to the ultimate environmental goal, it can be articulated
with more precision, without the vagueness that results from bending to the many political, economic, and cultural pressures that
seek to divert progress toward that goal. Moreover, if the parties
can focus on the environmental goal as such, it might be easier for
them to reach agreement at least on what is ultimately best for the
environment. The statement of environmental goal or end-state
should therefore reflect almost exclusively the conclusions of ecological scientists.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development illustrates how political and economic concerns can lead to a largely
uninformative and platitudinal goal statement.75 The Rio Declaration invokes a precautionary approach in order to "protect the
integrity of the global environmental and developmental system...
[r]ecognizing the integral and interdependent nature of the Earth,
our home .. . .7 Although this statement may be universally
acceptable to every political, economic, and cultural constituency,
it lacks the detail and clarity needed to inform the world community about the environmental goal agreed upon.
Such general or precatory statements are not necessarily useless,
for they may play an essential role in the initial development of an
74See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,375-79 (1989) (illustrating how goal statements provide guidance to administrative agencies).
75 Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at 879.
76 Id at 876 (emphasis omitted).
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international law principle and ,may help to achieve important
political objectives. However, a commitment to "precaution" on
every front is by its nature uninformative, and the least meaningful
thing for governments to agree upon is that "the biosphere and its
ecosystem" should be protected. Parties to treaties should agree
on detailed environmental goals and articulate when the precau77
tionary principle requires concrete efforts to achieve such goals.
Over time, the collection of future agreements that include environmental goal statements should begin to create an informative
and reasonably comprehensive mosaic of a desirable global environment. The environmental goal statements from numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements will .constitute a list of
environmental conditions warranting international precautionary
measures. Such statements may create pressure and progress
toward a global consensus on what the environmental condition of
the planet should be. Ultimately, a common vision of the desirable
global environment, might be reflected by international law in the
form of prohibitions and mandates. Unfortunately, such progress
is hampered by treaties in which political, economic, and cultural
concerns tend to produce language that is vague and compromising
even with respect to environmental goals.,
2. The Scope of Application
An adequate articulation of the precautionary principle should
also identify the scope of application for the principle. The scope
of application typically is specified either geographically or by the
aspect of the ecosystem to be protected. For example, some recent
agreements apply in geographically specified areas, such as the
North Sea 78 or Africa.79 Other treaties have specified their scope
by the aspect of the ecosystem to be protected, such as82the ozone
layer, 80 climate change, 8 ' and the marine environment.
Parties can further clarify or limit the scope of application by
identifying either a type of harm or a type of hazard. The type of
harm to be avoided can be identified specifically, such as "ozone
77 See Second World Climate Conference, supra note 45, at 475-76; Montreal Protocol,
supra note 2, at 1550-51; Final.North Sea Declaration, supra note 37, at 661; see also supra
notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing adequate statements).
78 See Final North Sea Declaration, supra note 37, at 659 n.1.
79 See Bamako Convention, supra note 10, at 776.
80 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at 1541.
81 See Second World Climate Conference, supra note 45, at 473; Climate Change Con-

vention, supra note 8, at 854.
8

See Final North Sea Declaration, supra note 37, at 659.
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layer... depletion' 8 3 or "eutrophication and acidification,",, or by
a general rule, such as "irreversible damage to the marine environment.18 5 Agreements can also be limited to specific types of hazard or causal agents that can bring about harm, such as agreements
to protect the ozone layer against certain substances such as
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),8 6 to prevent climate change due to
greenhouse gases,87 or to protect the African environment against
hazardous waste.' Agreements that can be achieved, however,
without further limiting their scope to specified harms or hazards
will provide greater environmental protection.
There are several reasons why this criterion should lead to a
more substantive principle of international law. First, parties are
more likely to make agreements invoking the precautionary principle if they know the precise scope of the agreement, since they can
then determine the extent to which agreement on the principle
.would encroach upon their sovereignty. This criterion respects the
sovereignty of states, while encouraging them to surrender it in
limited areas for the sake of environmental protection. Second,
when a party to an agreement approves the principle's jurisdictional reach, it identifies the extent to which the party's sovereignty
has been abridged. Hence, even though this criterion (more than
the statement of environmental goals) reflects each party's selfinterested balancing of political concerns, such balancing results in
definite jurisdictional boundaries agreeable to the parties. Third,
the scope of application provides objective standards by which the
world community can judge each party's performance under the
precautionary principle. It also signals the parties' willingness to
allow others to judge their performance objectively., Fourth, even
an invocation of the precautionary principle that limits the scope of
the principle's application acknowledges and helps illuminate the
principle. Over time, even self-interested applications of that principle with limited scopes of jurisdiction will begin to chart the
extent of the principle's accepted reach, and the extent to which
states customarily accede to that principle.

83See Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at 1550-51.
84 U.N. Transboundary Watercourses Convention, supra note 3, at 1314.
85 UNEP Report, supra note 5, at 152. The UNCED Text, supra note 51, at 8, provides a
list of the "greatest threat" contaminants to the marine environment.
86 Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at 1541.
87 See Second World Climate Conference, supra note 45, at 476.
88 Bamako Convention, supra note 10, at 775.
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3. Identification of Activities Requiring Precaution

Any informative articulation of the precautionary principle
should clearly identify those human activities that require precautionary measures - for example, dumping solid waste, discharging
hazardous liquid, emitting air pollutants, or transporting hazardous
materials. Such specification should contain criteria objective
enough to enable any actor to determine in advance whether the
contemplated activity triggers precautionary measures under the
agreement.
Identifying the activities requiring precaution has several advantages. Vague references to covered activities can undermine a primary objective of the precautionary approach by creating the
possibility that an activity is riot known to be covered until after
the environmental harm occurs. Identification of specific activities
to which precaution applies enables private and governmental
actors to plan their conduct, and provides them due notice concerning potential costs and penalties. Specification also helps to
ensure that obligated states do not construe the covered activities
too narrowly or too broadly.
a. Identification Independent of Effects

One useful way to satisfy this criterion is to identify the covered
activities by enumeration, using descriptions that are independent
of the effects caused by the activities. The Bamako OAU Convention, for example, regulates the. "generation, transportation and
disposal of hazardous wastes" 89 by listing categories of "hazardous
wastes" 90 and "hazardous characteristics." 91 All of the advantages
discussed above are achieved by such a listing of the triggering
activities, especially if the list is comprehensive and if it clearly
specifies the covered activities in terms that are objective and that
allow for the identification of those activities before they are
undertaken.
b.

Identification by Effects

An alternative is to identify covered activities by means of the
adverse effects produced. 92 Although identifying covered activities
89 Id at 791.
..
90 d. at 781 (Annex I: Categories of Wastes Which are Hazardous Wastes).

91Id. at 774 (Annex II: List of Hazardous Characteristics).

92 There is a distinction between using effects to define the "scope of application" and
using thein to identify the "covered activities" (those triggering the precautionary meas,ures). Identifying jurisdictional scope and triggering activities are functionally distinct
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by their effects runs some risk of not fully achieving the advantages
listed above, the risk is lessened if the likely effects are well-documented in advance. The most useful "specification-by-effect" contains at least three types of information: the nature of the adverse
effect, the environmental conditions capable of bringing about that
adverse effect, and the degree of confidence required for conclusions about the first two types of information. All three types of
information are generally needed before the desired degree of clarity has been achieved.
i. Kinds of Adverse Effects
A number of environmental treaties characterize the covered

activities as those having "irreversible" effects.93 Irreversible
effects allow no practical opportunity to correct the environmental
damage once it has occurred. A paradigm for an irreversible effect
is a nuclear explosion: the nuclear chain reaction, once begun, creates adverse radioactive effects lasting perhaps thousands of years.
Marine pollution treaties also define covered activities by reference to their effects when they ban the release of substances that
persist in the environment or substances that bioaccumulate in

marine species. Some formulations target human activities that
release substances capable of producing serious harmful effects.94
tasks. Geography or subject matter define the scope within which the precautionary principle has been invoked, while the covered activities occur within that scope. The jurisdictional scope may remain constant over time, for example, but new covered activities may
be added within that scope as new scientific information becomes available. Identifying
covered activities by their effects allows regulation of new activities under the treaty without amending the treaty.
93 See UNEP Report, supra note 5, at 152 ("[T]he impact of pollutants discharged into
the marine environment may result in irreversible damage."); Bergen Declaration, supra
note 44, at 431 ("[W]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent
environmental degradation.").
The meaning of "irreversible" probably implies a human time frame. The appropriate
time frame in a given case, however, may vary from species to species, from ecosystem to
ecosystem, and from adverse effect to adverse effect. Of course, from the standpoint of the
individual organism, death and many biological changes are irreversible.
94 See Second North Sea Declaration, supra note 6, art. XVI(1), at 840 (accepting the
principle of safeguarding the North Sea by reducing "polluting emissions of substances that
are persistent, toxic and liable to bioaccumulate"); see also Montreal Protocol, supra note
2, at 1550 ("Recognizing that world-wide emissions of certain substances can significantly
deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is likely to result in adverse
effects on human health and the environment."); UNCED Text, supra note 51, at 8 ("Contaminants which pose the greatest threat to the marine environment are sewage, nutrients,
synthetic organic compounds, sediments, litter and plastics, metals, radionuclides, oil/
hydrocarbons, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs).").
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This approach might assume that while any death is irreversible, a
human death is more serious than the death of any other organism.
ii. Exposure Conditions Capable of Causing the Adverse Effects
Many substances cause harm at a particular environmental exposure, concentration, or dose, but are harmless or even essential for
life at other levels. In such cases, if the treaty identifies the covered activities by their effects, the agreement should also identify
the condition or concentration of environmental concern. Specifying only the type of harm to be avoided might not be sufficient to
justify the placement of restrictions on activities in the name of an
international principle of precaution.
The environmental conditions that trigger precautionary obligations may vary dramatically, depending on the toxic agent and the
through which that agent operates. For
exposure
example, amechanism
single release of one substance might directly result in a
concentration that is toxic, 95 while another substance might achieve

a toxic concentration only due to a persistence in the environment
and bioaccumulation in living organisms. Another substance might
cause a serious condition only after adverse effects accumulate
from numerous releases. 96 An agreement can also specify the trig-

gering environmental condition by some other means, such as idenDomestic laws in the United States contain similar formulations. See, e.g., Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (regulating toxic
materials in the workplace by occupational health standards predicated on "material
impairment of health or functional capacity even if [an] employee has regular exposure to
the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life"); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 1004(5),. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988) (defining "hazardous
waste" in part in terms of ability to "cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness"); Clean
Air Act §§ 112(a)(6), (b)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(a)(6), (b)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (identifying "hazardous air pollutant[s]" according to "adverse human health effects (including,
but not limited to, substances which are known to be, or may reasonably be anticipated to
be, carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, neurotoxic, which cause reproductive dysfunction, or which are acutely or chronically toxic) or adverse environmental effects whether
through ambient concentrations, bioaccumulation, deposition, or otherwise").
95 A single release might create an acute toxic exposure, or it might be so persistent that
it produces a concentration threatening toxicity from chronic exposure. Cf Committee on
the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health, National Research
CouncilRisk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process 17-50 (1983)
[hereinafter Risk Assessment] (discussing factors in risk assessment and regulatory decision-making; noting that risk characterization turns on more than hazard identification).
96 Examples are releases of ozone-depleting compounds or greenhouse gases, whose
adverse effects of international concern are due to the discharge of large quantities.
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tifying a particular environmental pathway and a critical affected
group.97
iii. Degree of Confidence Required to Trigger Precautions
If covered activities are identified by virtue of a causal link to
effects, through specifying the kind of adverse effect and the exposure levels of concern, then the precautionary articulation should
state the required degree of confidence in our knowledge about
that causal link. Scientific uncertainty is inherent in all scientific
information, usually derivative of five sources of error in the scientific method: the variables chosen, the measurements made, the
samples drawn, the models employed, and the causal relationships
inferred.98 The task for treaty drafters is to determine what degree
of uncertainty is acceptable in identifying covered activities. In
other words, what degree of confidence in the scientific evidence
about effects should be required before precautionary measures
are mandated under international law?9 9

As a practical matter, articulations of the precautionary principle
in an international environmental instrument can be expected to
avoid extreme degrees of confidence in scientific conclusions about
the extent of harm or causation. The general principle itself certainly rejects requiring absolute certainty or even "reasonable cer-

tainty" before triggering precaution. Yet requiring precautionary
measures to be taken on the basis of speculation about mere pos-

sibilities of harm and causation, without any rational basis in sound
scientific data, is also generally rejected. The interest of states in
maintaining their sovereignty and the social interest in private
97 For a proposed release of radioactivity to the environment, for example, there might
be a particular pathway through which a group of people (the "critical group") is expected
to receive a radiation dose much larger than that received by the rest of the population. If
members of this group receive an insignificant dose, then it follows that other members of
the public probably do also. However, environmental pathways may change with time.
For example, the- critical group for discharge of radioactive waste into the Irish Sea
changed from a few individuals with a particular liking for laverbread made from edible
seaweed to a few salmon fishermen who were exposed to radioactivity deposited on the
shore. See James E. Hickey, Jr., International Law of the Land-Based Pollution of the
High Sea, 1.15, 1.37 (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University).
98 These distinct types of scientific uncertainty have also been defined as conceptual
uncertainty, measurement uncertainty, sampling uncertainty, modeling uncertainty, and
causal uncertainty. See Vern R. Walker, The Siren Songs of Science: Toward a Taxonomy
of Scientific Uncertainty for Decisionmakers, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 567, 572 (1991).
99 Treaties sometimes use vague language to describe the required degree of confidence.
See Second North Sea Declaration, supra note 6, at 838 ("possibly damaging effects");
Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, art. 7, at 1550 ("adverse effects resulting or likely to
result").
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industrial development oppose speculation as a predicate for international intervention. Unfortunately, the appropriate degree of
confidence beyond mere speculation but short of certainty is difficult to define. The standard probably varies from one environmental situation to another, and is dependent on many factors,

including the gravity of the harm addressed.
Articulations of the precautionary principle that identify the covered activities by means of their effects, however, should specify
the required degree of confidence in the scientific information.

Without such specification, precautionary principle provisions in
treaties are subject to an unacceptably wide range of interpretations by the parties and the world community. Two levels of confidence are suggested here as useful in formulating a precautionary

principle: a level of "reasonable scientific possibility" and' a level
of "reasonable scientific probability." A reasonable scientific possibility could be said to exist whenever empirical scientific data (as
opposed to mere hypotheses, speculation, or intuition) provide a

rational basis that warrants drawing the conclusions from the data,
even though reasonable scientific experts might disagree on
whether that conclusion is the only valid, inference from the data. 1°°
A reasonable scientific probability (or likelihood) exists whenever
scientific experts generally agree that the available data and methods used to interpret the data are valid and reliable, and when

there is also general acceptance by the relevant scientific community of the specific conclusions drawn from the data. "General
acceptance" means something less than unanimity, but more than a
minority opinion.
This criterion of adequacy could be satisfied by specifying either

of these two degrees of confidence, or both in combination. For
100 This degree of confidence can be satisfied in the face of wide disagreement among
scientists. It is similar to the degree of confidence required by various judicial bodies in
order to defer to findings of fact made on the basis of controverted scientific evidence. For
example, trial judges in the United States defer to jury determinations of fact, deciding
only whether there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to decide an issue. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(a). Appellate judges defer to factual findings of trial judges, deciding only
whether the finding was "clearly erroneous" given the evidence. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-76 (1985) (holding that the court of appeals conducted an
improper de novo review in setting aside the district court's finding in a sex discrimination
case that the petitioner was better qualified than another candidate for the job). Thal and
appellate courts defer to determinations of administrative agencies, overruling the agency's
factual determinations only if they have no rational basis. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (describing the arbitrary and capricious standard as merely an inquiry into whether the agency decision was
rational).
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example, an agreement might require a reasonable scientific
"probability" that the activity can produce the kind of adverse
effect that is to be avoided, but only a reasonable scientific "possibility" that the exposure contribution from the contemplated activity will produce the adverse effect. 01 To refine the requirements of
the precautionary principle of international law, some particular
degree of confidence should be chosen and defined in the
agreement.
4. Required PrecautionaryMeasures

An adequate articulation of the precautionary principle would
specify the precautionary measures required by international law
for undertaking a covered activity. 10 2 Although environmental
treaties sometimes prohibit a covered activity, 10 3 treaties more
commonly allow covered activities provided precautionary measures are taken. Precautionary measures include procedural
requirements, study requirements, and substantive standards.
a. ProceduralRequirements

Treaties often require certain procedures before covered activities may be undertaken; for example, notification must be given,
101 In the technical terminology of regulatory risk assessment, there would be a reasonable scientific probability about the hazard assessment and the dose-response assessment,
but only a reasonable scientific possibility concerning the exposure assessment. See European Commission Directive 93/67, 1993 J.0. (L 227) 9, 10-11 (defining a five-step risk
assessment - hazard identification, dose (concentration)-response (effect) assessment,
exposure assessment, risk characterization, and recommendations for risk reduction); see
also Risk Assessment, supra note 95, at 19-20 (identifying four steps in risk assessment hazard identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk
characterization).
102 The articulation of these precautionary measures should not be confused with the
statement of the environmental goal, or end-state. See supra part IV.B.1. The statement of
the environmental goal describes precisely the desirable state of the environment. The
precautionary requirements, by contrast, are the agreed means of achieving that environmental goal. While the statement of environmental goals should avoid balancing non-envi'ronmental factors, the precautionary requirements balance environmental objectives with
such considerations as technological feasibility, cost, cost-effectiveness, economic dislocation, and administrative feasibility. Agreements to "minimize," "limit," or "reduce" pollution discharge are not very informative, because they contemplate a balancing of multiple,
non-environmental factors, but do not provide sufficient guidance on precisely which factors are relevant and how the balance should be struck. Cf Risk Assessment, supra note
95, at 18-19, 69. (distinguishing risk assessment and risk management).
103 For example, Article III, Annex I of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea prohibits outright the dumping of land-based
organohalogen compounds such.as DDT. 11 I.L.M. 1291, 1295-97, 1310 (1972).
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permits obtained, licenses issued, or reporting requirements met. 1' 4
Although procedural requirements serve important functions, by
themselves they often fail to guarantee sufficient environmental
protection in a context where the threat of environmental degradation is so serious that the precautionary principle is needed.
b. Study Requirements
Whenever there is significant scientific uncertainty about actual
effects, covered activities might be allowed only if the actor is obligated to help reduce that uncertainty. Information-gathering activities might include compiling inventories of emissions, °5 preparing
environmental impact assessments, 0 6 or monitoring the effects of a
covered activity.' 0 7 A treaty might also, require a contribution to
more general research efforts beyond the specific action being
undertaken. One legitimate objective of the international community is to reduce the scientific uncertainty that created the need to
invoke the precautionary principle in the first place.
c. Substantive Standards
An articulation may also establish substantive standards that
must be met before a covered activity may. be undertaken. The
choice of a substantive standard should reflect the severity of the
risk posed by'the covered action. Where the risk of severe environmental damage is great, an agreed articulation of the precautionary principle might require actors to use the "Best Available
Technology" to reduce or treat emissions, 0 8 or require them to
prove that the planned activity will not cause or contribute over
time to harmful environmental effects.
104 See, e.g., Bamako Convention, supra note 10, art. 6, at 785-86; U.N. Transboundary
Watercourses Convention, supra note 3, arts. 13, 16, Annex II, at 1321, 1322, 1350-52.
105 See Climate Change Convention, supra note 8, art. 4(l)(a), at 855.
106 See U.N. Transboundary Watercourses Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(l)(h), at
1317.
107 See Bergen Declaration, supra note 44, art. IV(15)(b), at 436 (encouraging industry
to report annually on its environmental records, including information on the efficiency of
the use of energy and raw materials); Nordic Council Conference, supra note 42, at 101
(stressing the need for "an increased dissemination of information about new research
results concerning developments in marine pollution, its causes and its effects"); U.N.
Transboundary Watercourses Convention, supra note 3, art. 11, at 1320 (joint monitoring
and assessment provisions); Second North Sea Declaration, supra note 6, art. XVI(8), at
840 (agreeing to "establish, nationally and internationally, appropriate procedures for
monitoring inputs to the North Sea and for reporting the results of such monitoring").
108 See Final North Sea Declaration, supra note 37, at 662; U.N. Transboundary Watercourses, Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(1)(f), at 1317.
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If a treaty adopts a substantive standard, it should also identify a
suitably high degree of confidence that a planned activity will satisfy that standard. 1°9 In areas where the precautionary principle is
invoked, part of the uncertainty the articulation should resolve is
how certain a party or actor needs to be that the substantive standard will be met. Once the need for the precautionary principle
has been established and a covered activity is contemplated, it
might be appropriate to err on the side of restrictiveness before
allowing an actor to undertake potentially harmful activities. For
example, an actor might be required to establish that there is a
reasonable scientific probability that the specific action neither
poses nor contributes to a risk of serious and irreversible adverse
effects of the kind addressed in the treaty.
d. Other Actions
The parties might also ag;ee that they are obligated under the
precautionary principle to undertake other kinds of activities.
Examples include agreements to "increase the flow of capital and
environmentally sound technology" to less-developed countries" °
or commitments to sign or comply with the precautionary provisions of other treaties or conventions.
5. Applying the Criteria
It is not the intent of this Article to evaluate the many precautionary articulations in each of the existing treaties by using the
proposed criteria of adequacy. As suggested throughout the above
discussion, however, some articulations meet those criteria better
than others. The North Sea declarations provide illustrations of
very informative articulations."' These declarations have the
stated environmental goal of avoiding "potentially damaging
impacts of substances' that are persistent, toxic and liable to bioaccumulate. 1 2 The scope of application is geographically delineated." 3 Many activities are clearly identified as covered activities
109See supra part IV.B.3.b.iii for a discussion of degrees of confidence.
110 Bergen Declaration, supra note 44, art. II(13)(e), at 432; see also Climate Change
Convention, supra note 8, art. IV(10), at 858.
11 Second North Sea Declaration, supra note 6; Final North Sea.Declaration, supra note

37.
112 Final North Sea Declaration, supra note 37, at 661; see also Second North Sea Declaration, supra note 6, art. VII, at 838.
113 Final North Sea Declaration, supra note 37, at 659 n.1 ("the North Sea comprises the
body of water: a) southwards of latitude 620 N, and eastwards of longitude 5*W at the
north west side[,] b) northwards of latitude 570 44.80 N from the northern most point of
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without reference to their effects, such as operating municipal sewage treatment plants, dumping sewage sludge at sea, and conducting marine incineration." 4 Required precautionary measures
include. significantly reducing inputs by use of "Best Available
Technology," preventing PCBs from entering the marine environment, and reducing the risk of losing packaged goods at sea by
international maritime codes for transportaimplementing specific
15
goods."
tion of
By contrast, adequate treaty articulations of the precautionary
principle need not be as voluminous or detailed as in the North Sea
declarations. An articulation could satisfy the four criteria with
even minimal content and commitment. For example, an articulation might take the following approach and still meet the criteria:
Chemical C might prove to be so toxic to marine species S
that the precautionary principle must be applied throughout
marine area A to avoid the risk of further reduction of the
population of S in that area. Therefore, before any quantity
of C is discharged into marine area A, an environmental
impact. statement must be prepared and permits must be
obtained from at least two governments that are signatories
to this agreement.
Such a treaty articulation is at least adequate in its specificity, since
the world community would gain an informative statement of the
agreed precautionary requirements needed in that specific context.
V.

CONCLUSION

For decades states have recognized, in specific situations, the
need to take precautions to protect the environment. In some of
those situations, states have even been willing to sign agreements
to take precautionary measures. It is time, however, to develop
precaution beyond the realms of mere need and voluntary undertakings, and into an international obligation. The great complexity
of environmental matters, and the concerns of territorial sovereignty and individual freedom, may caution against a premature
and forced substantive statement on the nature of that obligation.
Yet states Should no longer be able to seem to invoke intrnational
"law" by merely referring in treaties to a "precautionary princiDenmark to the coast of Sweden, and c) eastwards of longitude 50 W and northwards of
latitude 480300 N, at the south side"); Second North Sea Declaration, supra note 6, art. I, at
838.
114 Final North Sea Declaration, supra note 37, at 664-65.
115 Id. at 662-63, 667.
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ple," while actually failing to acknowledge in those treaties that any
substantive obligations flow from this international principle.
States should now begin to provide a minimal amount of content
whenever they agree that precautionary obligations are required
under international law.
The proposed criteria are designed to facilitate the evolution of a
more substantive precautionary principle, without imposing any
particular content on it at the present time. It is hoped that by
consistent use of the proposed criteria on an agreement-by-agreement basis, there will emerge a more substantive principle of international law, upon which most states and private parties can
eventually agree. In other words, the four criteria proposed here
do not force that evolution down any particular substantive path,
but are intended to provide a structure for the evolutionary process
itself.
Parties that invoke the precautionary principle in future treaties
must formulate a clear vision of what is required by the precautionary principle. Ideally, every: future articulation of the precautionary principle should satisfy the four proposed criteria. It is no
longer adequate simply to pay tribute to a vague desire to prevent
pollution. In the future, treaties that invoke the precautionary
principle should be explicit about the required precautions that are
mandated by international law.
A commitment to use these four criteria, is a commitment to a
process which leaves to future negotiations the precise articulations
that balance sovereignty concerns and freedom of action against
the legitimate public interest of the international community in
protecting regional and global environments. Without a commitment to such a process, states will remain free to employ platitudinal articulations of the precautionary principle that will not protect
the environment, develop international environmental law, or
advance the cause of achieving true sustainable development in the
decades ahead.
Adherence to the four criteria will result in clearer and more
detailed treaty articulations of the precautionary principle in the
future. Treaty obligations will be easier to predict as consistency
among treaties emerges in the articulation of the precautionary
principle. Clarity and consistency will contribute to the evolution
of a precautionary principle that would bind all segments of the
international community whether or not they are parties to any
specific treaty. International agreement to use these proposed criteria will be an important and positive step in that direction.

